Back to Summer 2009

Somali Piracy
This Summer, It's No Movie

Brentoni Gainer-Salim

  In a nation where the importance of a functional fly screen far exceeds that of the latest release on the silver screen, the glorified image of piracy the United States has recently developed after the release of the popular Pirates of the Caribbean films would be almost laughable if not for the dire circumstances at hand. Throughout the past year, a handful of incidents involving these “Somali pirates” have passed the international filter and found themselves on the frontline of American cable news. However, the American understanding of this situation is quite limited. National opinions are based almost solely on the biased portrayals of CNN, FoxNews, and MSNBC. As these incidents continue to occur with an increased frequency, the public deserves a factual, objective account of the events, unspoiled by various media biases.

  Unfortunately, the novelty that this situation offers presents tantalizing fodder for news companies in modern America. Either the result or the cause of this corporate eagerness to create a media frenzy is the perpetual involvement of the United States military. Whether these storms are begun by the chicken or the egg, the armed forces of the United States have an uncanny penchant for sticking their nose into business that evokes strong emotional opinions across the world. Though the United States Navy has undoubtedly driven the United States head first into another controversial international conflict, they are not alone in their pursuit of security on these well-traveled sea routes.

  The naval military institutions of many of the world’s premier states have been involved in several minor security tussles with these ambitious, wayward fishermen since they began patrolling the waters east of the Somali coast as ransom hunters in early 2008. The French Navy captured eleven pirates after a small group of them mistook a French warship for a commercial liner in May 2008. Shortly after, the British Royal Navy intercepted a couple of suspicious-looking, unmarked skiffs in the Gulf of Aden. Due to international rules of engagement, the navy was obligated to set the pirates free based on their terms of capture. The most infamous incident of all, however, involves the United States Navy SEALs and their handling of a hostage situation earlier this year in April. In what many have considered to be an overreaction, President Barack Obama sanctioned sniping the pirates after having been informed of one pirate with a gun to the back of hostage Captain Richard Phillips. These are just some of the major encounters that have been documented within the past three months. With the rate of hijacked ships skyrocketing, the Indian Ocean is looking to be an increasingly treacherous place for commercial cargo ships as the year progresses.

  The implications of these new seaborne perils spell increased expense for commercial ships which now must account for adequate protection, in addition to the regular cost of fuel and maintenance. Shipping companies which utilize the wide array of sea routes susceptible to this piracy must now face a key decision of fight or flight regarding the future usage of these crucial trade routes. Both choices involve an increased expense consisting of either a longer distance to travel in order to avoid the radius of the pirates’ operation or the cost of equipping vessels with weaponry functions and armed security forces

  Piracy in Somalia has been an exclusively recent phenomenon for a number of reasons, most of which are political. It is reasonable to assume that these pirates would not have adopted their violent proclivities if they had other means of supporting themselves. The state of Somalia has been struggling to overcome the destruction brought upon it by failed government and civil war for the past few decades; however, it was not until recently that the government completely succumbed to the disunion of its citizens. Now, in Somalia’s capital of Mogadishu, the United Nations recognized government has been abandoned by the Somali people to various degrees, which effectively deems it functionally illegitimate.to combat the pirates directly. Thus far, most companies have opted for neither option, choosing to maintain the most expeditious trade routes while ignoring the need for increased security with the hope that pirating activity would soon subside. However, these hopes have, for the most part, been in vain. As the threats of piracy and hostage situations on the high seas have only become more prominent, these companies may need to look to alternative strategies in order to ensure the safe passage of cargo, both human and material, to their desired destinations. For these reasons, the support that many show for the military’s attempts to eliminate piracy by eliminating the pirates themselves seems to be justified from a purely corporate standpoint.

  Throughout Somalia, there are many serious sociopolitical problems, including separatist movements such as the one located in Puntland, the region which a majority of the pirates call home. The self-declared “Puntland State of Somalia” operates under questionable leadership, which is part of the reason for resorting to piracy in the first place. The website of this independent regional government curiously neglects to mention piracy among the many “current issues” being dealt with. This is an observation that deserves further research and scrutiny because the central government of Puntland could be considered the primary negative factor contributing to the pirates’ plight.

  Another separatist region, located north of Puntland, known as Somaliland represents a different shard of this shattered nation. Somaliland has been engaged in civil conflict with Puntland for a number of years. Unlike Puntland, which is separatist only in that it demands a certain level of autonomy, Somaliland insists upon complete secession and internationally recognized independence from the defunct state of Somalia. This in turn means that the two neighboring regions must reconcile a significant discrepancy in ideology which translates to direct violent conflict. Therefore, Somalia is likely its own worst enemy as it attempts to rebound from an era of violent political chaos. In order to rid the world of piracy, the most effective strategy would arguably be to help restore the national infrastructure by transfers of aid, providing a permanent solution superior to wiping out a single wave of pirates.

  A recent article published by the Vancouver Sun claims that the “crackdown” on Somali Pirates has been, in short, a success. This claim is substantiated by mentioning the more than one hundred arrests that have been made since the issue arose last year. However, this seemingly large number pales in comparison to the estimated number of pirates in the region, which easily sails into the thousands. Any confidence exuded by the western press is likely the product of a few well-documented, successful skirmishes waged by properly-armed, national naval forces against outnumbered and ill-equipped Somali brigades. One of the most publicized of these events has been the previously mentioned debacle involving the rescue mission orchestrated by the United States Navy to save a kidnapped captain. This tale, which was portrayed as heroic and miraculous by a majority of U.S. media outlets, was actually quite a rare example of successful containment regarding the pirates. 

  There are simply not a sufficient number of qualified forces to allocate to an issue of this magnitude. This is largely due to the fact that it is difficult to pinpoint whose responsibility it is to regulate the pirates’ activities. Since the Somali government, as it is recognized by the UN, no longer operates with any real regulatory power, the responsibility rests with the governments of states which are either directly or indirectly affected by the capture of trading ships. However, there are so many states that use the very efficient trade routes in question that responsibility to act upon the continuing threats is easily shrugged off by single states, leaving the problem largely untouched.

  Somali piracy is not a subsiding threat, because the gasoline that fueled the fire is still flowing. In fact, the statistics seem to prove that the attacks are becoming even more frequent. The political situation in Somalia is as catastrophic as it has ever been, perhaps even worsening. Without the ability to make a living by any conservative means, the men of Puntland will be compelled to resort to crime such as thievery and kidnapping. This fire is fueled by a national government which, despite its obvious hand in causing the mess, does not possess the capacity to put them out. Therefore, the responsibility rests with other institutions that are capable of eliminating piracy. For many of these options though, such as the United States or the European Union, there is little political incentive for action. Small, individual incidents of piracy in distant waters do not constitute a high priority within the governments of wealthy countries and organizations with larger problems at hand. Unless a drastic internal shift occurs within Somalia allowing the pirates to find alternative means of survival or the US decides to make a concerted effort to wipe out the pirates with military force, it would be foolish to think that a small organization created out of need would cease operations in favor of living a life consumed by famine and suffering in the form of extreme poverty and civil war. In the meantime, the American public may do better to replace their strident revulsion with empathy while actively seeking both sides of this complex story.

Next: Perceptions on Piracy

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